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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant agrees with the statement of facts
as they are ably presented in the Brief of the Plaintiff.
PURPOSE OF THE ACT
CHAPTER

24, LAWS OF UTAH 1949

To deal adequately with the problem of the constitutionality of a statute it appears to the writer
that the purpose of the act must be carefully con-
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suited. The act provides for the creation of Improvements Districts. The Act itself sets forth its
purpose in its first section as follows:
" .... any district so created shall have
authority through construction, purchase, gift
or condemnation, or any combination thereof,
to acquire and operate all or any part of the
following or any combination thereof:
" ( 1) Systems for the supply, treatment
and distribution of water; and
" ( 2) Systems for the collection, treatment and disposition of sewage."
Behind that terse statement of powers and
purposes is a significant story tied in with the development of the population, growth and living conditions of the unincorporated areas of this State.
During the past ten years there has been, in
various Counties of Utah, a semi-urbanization of
unincorporated areas. The problems attendant to
this development have become particularly act1te
in Salt Lake County. Magna, Hunter, Pleasant
Green, Granger, Taylorsville, Granite Park, Union,
Chesterfield, East Mill Creek, are examples of the
types of communities that were in the minds of the
men who drafted the statute being challenged. These
are areas in which their leaders saw need for certain
services, to-wit: water supply and sewage disposal,
that could only be supplied by joint community action. Private enterprise could not or did not meet the
problems and people found the· necessity of turning
to the Government for assistance.
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One alternative was for the various areas involved to incorporate and become municipalities, i.e.,
cities or towns. But there was and is no need for
such areas to assume all the burdens and functions
of incorporation. Many neecssary governmental services are being provided by the County governments.
However, the increased urbanization has created a situation where the County government is
inadequate and unable to meet the pressing needs of
particular sections of the counties, yet there is no
need or desire to assume many of the functions,
burdens - taxwise and otherwise - attendant upon
the creation of cities and towns.
These areas are a cross between the urban and
the rural, in a twilight zone of community development where the County government cannot satisfy
and the myriad functions of the municipality are
not needed. There has been a compulsion and need
for joint community action, but no legal devise or
entity available for them to use to meet their needs.
That need for a semi-city set-up gave rise to the
creation of the "Improvement District," the creature
of the law under discussion in this cause. It is in the
mind of the writer a vital, essential tool and devise
of community action, a vehicle equipped to negotiate
a course of community effort between the anarchy
of unincorporatedness and the over-government of
a municipality. A course which no available governmental vehicle has been equipped to travel. These
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communities are governmental "hitch-hikers." They
thumb a ride with the County part way, but the
County can't carry them the entire distance. They
can't afford and don't need the Cadillac proportions
of a municipality, but do need some less ambitious
and less complicated vehicle to transport them to
satisfactory living conditions. The Improvement District provides that vehicle.
THE LAW
The writer will attempt to answer Plaintiff's
Brief as it is set forth in its various sections.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SA.
That the Legislature in enacting said
statute exceeded its constitutional powers.
This allegation recurs numerous times in a general way in the Plaintiff's Brief in connection with
other sections of the brief and with other alleged
violations of the Constitution. However, the writer
desires to cite the language of Mr. Justice Folland
found in the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 Pac.
2d at Page 534 (Utah) 1934 as a general answer
to Plaintiff's charge. Judge Folland in his opinion
upholding the constitutionality of Utah's Metropolitan Water District Law quoted from the Utah case
of Kimball vs. Grantsville City, 57 Pac. 1, using
these words :
"The State having thus committed its
whole lawmaking power to the legislature, ex-
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cepting such as is expressly or impliedly withheld by the State or Federal Constitution, it
has plenary power for all purposes of Civil
government. Therefore, in the absence of any
constitutional restraint, express or implied,
the legislature may act upon any subject within the sphere of government. It may enact
laws affecting the state at large, and all its
people; and for the purpose of creating local
jurisdictions it may establish districts, provide for the incorporation of towns and cities,
and enact laws for the government of such
districts and municipalities."
The writer contends now and will contend later
at greater length that for purposes of treating the
constitutional provision regarding powers of the legislature, the Metropolitan Water District Act and
the Improvement District Act, here under discussion,
are analogous.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8B.
"That said statute violates the provisions
of Article VI, Section 29 ... in that it delegates to a special commission, private corporation or association power to assume, supervise or interfere with municipal functions ...
The Constitutional provision involved reads as
follows:
_"The Legislature shall not delegate to
any special commission, private corporation or
association, any power to make, supervise or
interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property or effects, whether held in
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trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a
capitol site, or to perform any municipal functions.''
Defendant contends that Chapter 24, Laws of
Utah, 1949, does not delegate to the Improvement
District or its Board power to assume, supervise or
interfere with municipal functions because the term
"Municipal functions" as used in the constitutional
.. .. provision as interpreted by the Utah Courts means
the functions of a given city or town .. In other words,
according to the interpretation of that section of the
Constitution placed on it by the Supreme Court of
Utah in the case of Logan City vs. Public Utilities
Commission, 271 Pac. 961 (1928). The Constitution
means:
"No special commission, private corporation or association shall be delegated power
to assume, supervise or interfere with the
municipal functions of any particular or given city or town."
In the Logan City vs. Public Utilities Commission of Utah case the facts were that the City of
Logan owned and operated its own light and power
plant and provided electricity for the inhabitants of
the city. A conflict arose between the City and the
Utah Power and Light Company and the parties
took the matter before the Public Utilities Commission of Utah. Among other things the Commission,
in an effort to achieve equity between the parties
ordered the City of Logan to sell its electricity at
certain rates. The matter was taken to the Supreme
Court of Utah and the Court said that the Public
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Utilities Commission could not set the city's electric
rates because in doing that the Commission was
interfering with a function of the municipality and
in so doing was violating the Constitution.
In the course of the opinions of members of the
Court the purpose and meaning of the constitutional
provision involved here was exhaustively analyzed.
Mr. Justice Straup said at Page 972:
''We think it clear that the undoubted
purpose of the Constitutoinal provision is to
hold inviolate the right of local self-government of cities and towns with respect to municipal improvements, money, property, effects,
the levying of taxes, and the performance of
municipal functions."
He referred to the contention of the Public Utilities
Commission that it was not a "special commission"
and therefore could interfere with the functions of
the municipality without violating the constitutional
provision. In discrediting that argument the Justice
said:
''We think such a construction of the section is too narrow, and one which in effect
impairs the very essence and purpose of it,
deprives cities and towns of local self-government, and interferes with their power to levy
taxes and in the performance of their municipal corporate affairs with respect to their
improvements, property and municipal functions.''
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Both of the above qt1otations clearly reveal that
the Court was not thinking of municipal functions
in the abstract, but declaring that the writers of the
Constitution had in mind the functions of a given,
particular municipality, i. e., city or town.
Then the Justice on Page 973 used language
which supports our contention very pointedly when
he said:
"To say that the power of the Commission notwithstanding the Constitution, to supervise, regulate and control the business and
fix rates and charges of a municipally owned
and operated plant is the same as that of a
privately owned public utility, is to disregard
or not give effect to the Constitution, for a
municipality is specifically and exclusively
mentioned therein, and the Constitution in
such particular expressly a n d exclusively
adopted for the benefit and protection of only
municipalities."
As indicated earlier in his opinion, the Justice
meant cities and towns when he used the term municipalities.
Judge Gideon in a concurring opinion treated
.the meaning of the constitutional provision in stat-

1ng:

"What was intended by the adoption of
this section? (Article VI, Section 29) To determine the intent of the Constitution makers
the language used by them must be and should
be read in the light of the conditions in the
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territory of Utah at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, as well as in the light
of the history of the people and their institutions at and prior to that time. Local self-government, or what is generally designated as
'home rule', is not an innovation in this country. It is nothing new for municipalities, in
Utah or elsewhere in the United States, to
enjoy home rule or local self-government. The
fact and the right of local self-government
existed and was exercised from the earliest
settlement of the various territories. The right
was enjoyed long prior to the adoption of
State Constitutions and the admission of the
Territories into the Union as independent
States.
"Section 29 of Article VI of the Utah
Constitution did not grant to municipalities
the power to exercise the right of local selfgovernment, or to own and control property,
or to own and operate a public utility for the
benefit of the inhabitants of such municipalities. These benefits the municipalities already
enjoyed. On the contrary the section is a limitation of the power of the Legislature to delegate to any body, save only regularly elected
officers of the municipalities, the right to supervise or interfere with the property of the
municipalities, or to perform any municipal
functions. The purpose of the constitutional
provision quoted was to guarantee to the municipalities local self-government, and to deny
to the Legislature any power to delegate to
any body other than the local government the
right of supervision over or interference with
the property of the various municipalities
within the state."
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"Let it be conceded that in the absence of
constitutional inhibition, the Legislature cot1ld
take the government of the cities from the
people residing therein and create new forms
of government under the immediate control
of the Legislatt1re. That is one thing. The
delegation of the right to a commission, not
the choice of the inhabitants, is quite another
thing. The denial of the latter is what the
above-quoted provision of the constitution, as
I interpret it in the light of history, means."
I don't see how Otlr Court could explain any
more clearly tha11 two of its Judges have explained
in this case that Section 29 of Article VI applies
only to cities and towns and that the term "municipal functions" when used in this constitutional provision means the functions being exercised by any
given city or town. True the term "municipal functions" is often used to describe functions which are
of a nature and type ordinarily and traditionally
exercised by cities and towns. But that is using the
term "municipal functions" in a sense foreign and
different from the simple meaning it has as used in
our Constitution.
Plaintiff's theory set forth with much municipalaver, is that the Constitution is using the term
"municipal functions" in its abstract, nebulous
meaning. Plaintiff believes the Constitution makers
conceived of a municipal function as an itinerant
ego that could detach itself from a muicipality, i. e.,
city or town, and wander at will to be captured and
put to work by other governmental units such as
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counties. A sort of "municipal function in the sky"
theory. That theory of floating municipal functions
is the meaning given to municipal functions by many
courts and text writers and Plaintiff is not alone in
using it. But according to the Court's words in the
Logan City case, the writers of the Constitution
were not using and did not intend to use the term
municipal functions in that sense. They idetified a
municipal fuction with a given municipality, i. e.,
city or town.
Plantiff apparently believes that a municipal
function may detach itself from a city or town and
wander into the corral of a "County" and be lassoed,
branded and used by a "County," but he doesn't
think the Legislature has the right to allow any
corporation, special commission or association or
any governmental agency to use "municipal functions."
The Utah Court, the writer contends, asserts
that the Constitution writers were not concerned
about who used municipal functions in the abstract.
They weren't concerned about who supplied water
or electricity or abated mosquitoes or provided police protection or dug sewers or cleaned streets ; they
only wanted to make sure that if a particular city
or town was engaging in those activities, nobody
could come into the city, kick the waterworks superintendent out of his office and take over his job.
To further demonstrate the point that the constitutional provision according to the Utah Court,
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was designed to protect given, existing municipalities from interference, and not to prevent the exercise of "municipal functions" in the abstract, let us
pursue to a conclusion in the light of the Logan
City case, the "Abstract municipal function" or
"municipal function in the sky" theory of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff will concede that a Utah city has the
right to own and operate its own power system;
Plaintiff must further concede that in the Logan
City case the Court considered operation of such a
system a municipal function. If Plaintiff's theory
is that there are types of activity which are ''municipal functions" and which are "municipal functions" no matter who performs them and that they
can only be legally performed by municipalities (or
counties) then the conclusion must follow that the
Utah Power and Light Company, or any other private power and light company, is performing "municipal functions" and doing so in violation of Article
VI, Section 29 of the Constitution and should be
enjoined. Why? Because private power and light
companies are chartered and permitted to exist in
the state by virtue of certain statutes passed by the
Legislature. He must then argue that any statute
which implements the establishment, existence and
operation of a private power company is unconstitutional because it delegates to a private corporation power to perform "municipal functions."
The foregoing only illustrates the absurdity of
the "municipal functions in the sky" theory as far
as the interpretation of this section of the Constitution is concerned.
,
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The writer will grant that if Magna were an
incorporated town or city and had its own city water
system, and the Legislature delegated to an Improvement District the authority to dictate to Magna City the water rates it should charge, or the
size of pipe it should use, etc., then admittedly the
statute would be delegating to the District power
to assume, supervise or interfere with a function
of the city of Magna and such a law would be unconstitutional. But this law, of course, does not do
that.
To summarize the significance of the Utah
Court's interpretation of the meaning of Article
VI Section 29 of the Constitution we can say that
the Court has rewritten the provision to clarify it
and in the light of that court decision the Constitutional provision reads.
"The Legislature shall not delegate to
any special Commission, private corporation
or association any power to make, supervise
or interfere with any Municipality's, that is
city's or town's, improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site or
to perform any functions of any given city
or town.''
As previously indicated by the writer, Plaintiff
enlarges on his doctrine of "municipal functions in
the sky" by arguing that the functions of counties
are "municipal functions." Certainly that is not true
in contemplation of the meaning of. Article VI Sec-
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tion 29 as interpreted in the Logan City case. To
repeat Mr. Justice Straup's words in reference to
the application of the constitutional provision:
" .... for a municipality is specifically
and exclusively mentioned therein, and the
Constitution in such particular expressly and
exclusively adopted for the benefit and protection of on.ly municipalities."
Other language of the Cot1rt quoted above indicates
clearly that the Court meant cities and towns when
it used the term "municipalities" and thus the Court
confines the application of that constitutional provision to cities and towns and that constitutional
provision can not be relied tlpon by counties to prevent the assumption or supervision of or interference with their functions.
Even if we assumed for sake of argument that
Article VI Section 29 was designed to spread its
cloak of protection over County governments, still
this statute does not enable an Improvement District to assume, supervise or interfere with functions of the County if the County does not want it
to do so for the statute itself protects the County.
An Improvement District is established and created
by the Board of County Commissioners under authority of the statute and nothing in the statute
requires or constrains the County Commission to
establish a District if it does not desire to do so.
The words of the first section of the statute, Chapter 24, Session Laws of Utah 1949, reads as follows:
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"The Board of County Commissioners of
each County in this State may hereafter establish in the manner hereinafter provided, one
or more improvement districts in such count y .... "
The machinery for the estalishment of the district
is operated by the County Commission. Nothing appears in the statute which makes it mandatory on
the commission to create a district and the statute
provides no other method by which an improvement
district can be established.
From the two standpoints set forth above then
it is fallacious to argue that the law in question
violates Article VI Section 29 of the Constitution
as far as counties are concerned.
This Court was faced with an interpretation of
this section of the Constitution in adjudicating the
constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District
Act in the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 Pac. 2d
530,. decided in 1934. As far as the application of
this section of the Constitution is concerned the
Metropolitan Water District and the Improvement
District are analogous. Their functions and purposes generally are the same. 'They are both created
by authorization of State Statutes. They fill a need
not satisfied by existing City or County governments. The Titles of the two acts involved indicate
their similarity. The Title of the Metropolitan Water District Act reads as follows :
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"An Act providing for the Incorporation,
Government and Management of Metropolitan Water Districts, Authorizing Such Districts to Inctlr Bonded Debt and to Acquire,
Construct, Operate and Manage Works and
Property, providing for the Taxation of Property Therein and the Performance of Certain Functions Relating Thereto by Officers
of Counties, Providing for the Addition of
Area Thereto and the Exclusion of Area
Therefrom and At1thorizing Municipal Corporations to Aid and Participate in the Incorporation of Such Districts."
The Title of the Improvement District Act
reads:
"An Act Authorizing the Creation of
Improvement Di$tricts in the Various Counties of the State, Providing for the Government and Powers of Such Districts, Authorizing the Acquisition of Improvements by such
Districts, and the Issuance of Bonds of the
District in Payment Therefor, Providing for
the Levy of Taxes to pay such bonds as May
be Issued Hereunder Payable From Taxes and
for the Levy of Taxes to Carry Out the Purpose for Which Such Bonds as are Not payable for Taxes, Granting the Power of Eminent Domain to such Districts, Providing
for Issuance of Refunding Bonds by Such
Districts and Making Certain Provisions with
Respect to the Foregoing ... "
The similarity of purposes of the two Districts
is documented by the statements of those purposes
in the statute. Section 100-10-3 sets forth the pur-
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pose of the Metropolitan Water District in the following words :
"Metropolitan Water District may be organized hereunder for the purpose of acquiring, appropriating, developing, storing, selling, leasing and distributing water for, and
devoting water to, municipal and domestic
purposes, irrigation, power, milling, manufacturing and any and all other beneficial
uses ... "
The purpose of the Improvement District is
set forth in Chapter 24 Section 1 as follows:
" . . . any district so created shall have
authority through construction, purchase, gift
or condemnation, or any combination thereof, to acquire and operate all or any part of
the following, or any combination thereof:
" ( 1) Systems for the supply, treatment
and distribution of water; and
'' ( 2)

~ystems for the collection, treatment and disposition of sewage."

As far as the handling of water is concerned
the Improvement District is designed to do the
same thing for unincorporated areas that the Metropolitan Water District is designed to do for incorporated areas. Added to the general purposes and
powers of the Improvement Districts is the power
to handle sewage - a vital, critical consideration
in many unincorporated areas in Utah and a natural concommitant of the task of providing water.
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In the Meiling case it was contended that the
Metropolitan Water District Act violated Article VI
Section 29 because the act delegated power to a
special commission, private corporation or association to assume, supervise or interfere with a municipal improvement and to perform municipal functions. Striking down that contention Mr. Justice
Folland, speaking for the Court, said at page 535:
"The contention cannot be sustained for
the reason that the board of directors to whom
the management and control of the district
has been intrusted, and which is to exercise
the powers and perform the functions of the
public agency thus created, does not come
within the designation 'special commission,
private corporation or association' to which
the inhibitions of the sections apply."
The justice then cited the case of City of Pasadena vs. Chamberlain and proceeded:
"Nor does the act provide for interference with any municipal improvement, money,
property or effects. The power of control
vested in the board of directors is over the
property, improvements, money, and effects
of the district, and not that of any of the
cities or towns whose territorial boundaries
may be coincidental with that of the district
or included therein. The powers of the board
are limited by the act to the levying of taxes
for the public purposes mentioned therein .... ·
None of the municipal functions of the component cities or towns is conferred on or delegated to the Metropolitan Water District.
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Each of such cities and towns will possess and
may continue to exercise every municipal
function it now has. There need be no friction between the two, but the closest cooperation is contemplated and should result."
The activities of the Magna Water District or
any other Improvement District will not interfere
with the activities of any municipality and the activities of the Magna Water District do not and will
not conflict with any activities of Salt Lake County.
The Plaintiff in his Brief indicates that Salt Lake
County is considering furnishing water to the entire
county. That is not true. Salt Lake County is considering sponsoring of a County Wide Conservancy
District to provide the main distribution lines and
act as wholesaler of the water to various cities,
towns, improvement districts and private water
companies. The County is not considering going into
the retail water business.
In the opinion of the writer there is less reason
to believe an Improvement District will interfere,
etc., with municipal functions than there is to believe the same of a Metropolitan Water District,
because cities are necessarily located within the
boundaries of a metropolitan water district, and in
some instances such as in the case of Salt Lake City
and Provo the boundar~es of the Districts and of the
cities are co-terminous. Yet in the case of Provo City
vs. Evans, 48 Pac. 2d 555, decided in 1935, the
Supreme Court of Utah followed its decision in the
Lehi City case and upheld the constitutionality of
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the law even though the boundaries of the District
and the city were identical. In Salt Lake City the
same situation exists. The District has power to tax
exactly the same people as the City has authority to
tax. The District and the City are both engaged in
the water bt1siness. Yet the excellent and effective
manner in which the two have worked together to
provide Salt Lake City with a secure source of water
supply has vindicated the statement of Justice Folland quoted above to the effect that:
"There need be no friction between the
two, but the closest cooperation is contemplated and should result."
There is every reason to believe that similar
cooperation should and will exist between Improvement Districts and County Governments which create them. If .the Counties do not want the Districts,
if they are afraid of encroachment, interference,
etc., the counties do not have to create them.
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PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8B.
"That said Statute violates the provisions of . . . . Article XI Section 5. Article XI
Section 5 reads: 'Corporations for municipal
purposes shall not be created by special laws.
The Legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organization and
classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which laws may be altered, amended or repealed'."
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that the above
section of the Constitution is violated by the law
under consideration and in his Brief he joins to
this Section Article VI Section 26 which reads in
part:
"In all cases where a general law can be
applicable, no special law shall be enacted."
Treating Section 5 of Article XI first. The Improvement District Law does not violate that section because: (1) it does not create a corporation;
(2) it does not create districts for "municipal purposes" as that term is used in the Constitution; and
(3) the law is not a special law, but a general law
applicable to the entire state and potentially of benefit directly or indirectly to all the people of the State
whether they live in incorporated or unincorporated
areas. For example: Murray residents may be extremely interested in what East Mill 'creek or Granite Park do with their sewage.
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In the light of the interpretation of this section
of our Constitution by our Court the Section should
correctly and more accurately read:
"Corporations for municipal purposes
shall not be created by special laws. The Legislature by general laws shall provide for the
incorporation, organization, and classification
of municipalities, ie: Cities and Towns in
proportion to population, etc."
This interpretation is borne out by the contents
of the remainder of the Section of the Constitution.
Those contents deal solely with he creation, government, functions, etc., of cities and towns.
If the Constitution had said no public agency or
legal entity shall be created by general or special
law for the purpose of exercising any functions
which are exercised by cities and towns, then· the
Plaintiff would have something. Plaintiff is trying
to contort the language of the section to read that
way, but it does not read that way.
It appears to the writer that the Plaintiff does
not recognize that the writers of the Constitution in
using the words"Municipal," "municipality," "municipal purposes" and "municipal functions" had in
mind only cities and towns and not municipal functions in the abstract.
The writers of the Constitution in that section
were not concerned about preventing the creation of
corporations or districts or public agencies to han-
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dle water, irrigation, drainage, sewage or mosquito
abatement problems, all of which may be considered
municipal functions in the abstract. They put that
provision in the Constitution to prevent the Legislature from creating cities and towns by special
laws.
Proceeding to the treatment of this problem by
the Utah Court, the Court in deciding the case cited
supra, Lehi City vs. Meiling, declared that the Metropolitan Water District Act does not violate. Article
VI Section 26 because, said the Court, the law was
not a special law, but a general law. Mr. Justice
Folland said on page 536, headnote 4:
"It is urged the act is special and not
general, in violation of Article VI Section 26,
to the effect that 'in all cases where a general
law can be applicable, no special law shall be
enacted.' The act purports to be a general law
applicaple to all portions of the State and
makes available to the inhabitants of all cities
and towns seeKing to take advantage of its
provisions, the opportunity of organizing
Metropolitan Water Districts. The mere
fact that its benefits may, under present opportunities and conditions, be availed of by
a part of the State only, does not mitigate
against its validity as a ·general law. City of
Pasadena vs. Chamberlain, supra. While only
one group of cities or towns may now attempt
to organize under its provisions, yet at any
future time other cities and towns may do
likewise. The act is not limited to any particular cities or towns, or to any particular
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locality in the State, but it operates uniformly
on every city or town which may choose to
take advantage of its provisions. In form as
well as in substance, it is a general law and
not special."
Similar language could be used with regard to
the Improvement District Act. 'The act is a general
law applicable to all portions of the State and makes
available to the inhabitants of all unincorporated
areas, seeking to take advantage of its provisions,
the opportunity of organizing improvement districts. The mere fact that its benefits may, under
present opportunities and conditions, be availed of
by a part of the State only, does not mitigate against
its validity as a general law. While only one unincorporated area may now attempt to organize under
its provisions, yet at any future time other unincorporated areas may do likewise. The act is not lilnited to any particular unincorporated area or to
any particular locality in the State, but it operates
uniformly on every unincorporated area which may
choose to take advantage of its provisions. In form
as well as in substance it is a general law and not
a special law.
The writer believes the opinion of our Court
in the case of Patterick vs. Carbon County Conservancy District, 145 Pac. 2d 503 ( 1944), is in point
on this matter as well as with regard to many other
matters later treated herein. That case was brought
before the Court in an original proceeding to test
the constitutionality of the Water Conservancy Act.
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For purposes of this constitutional question (general or special law) the conservancy district and the
improvement district are closely analogous. The
purpose of the conservancy district is stated in its
declaration of policy found in Section 100-11-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, Paragraph (g) and its subparagraphs:
" ( 1) To control, make use of and apply
to beneficial use all unappropriated waters in
this State to a direct and supplemental use of
such waters for domestic, manufacturing, irrigation, power and other beneficial uses.
"(2) To obtain from water in Utah the
highest duty for domestic uses and irrigation
of lands in Utah within the terms of interstate compacts or otherwise."
The Conservancy District is a legal entity not a city, not a county - to deal with the use of
water. It is conceived for broader application, geographically speaking, than the Improvement District and it may include both incorporated and unincorporated areas and it may transcend the boundaries of one County. However, the general nature
of its functions is the same as that of the Improvement District. It is created by authority of a Legislative enactment as is the Improvement District.
The Petitioner in the Conservancy District case
contended that the Water Conservancy District Act
violated Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution
in that it was a "special law." Attacking that prob-
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lem, Mr. Justice Wade said at page 511 of the
opinion:
" . . . . Sec. 100-11-15 does not violate
Section 26 Article VI of the Constitution of
Utah since a water conservancy district is not
organized under a special law and being a
quasi-mt1nicipal corporation formed for public purposes it is within the discretion of the
Legislature to grant it any powers, not expressly inhibited by the Constitution, to further such purposes, including the power of
taxation. It is the public purposes for which
a water conservancy district is organized that
distinguishes it from drainage or irrigation
districts. The public purposes for which a
water conservancy district is organized inures
to the benefit of the public generally and
therefore the public can be charged for such
benefits through general taxation."
The Court cites the Lehi :City case in support.
Patterick also contended Section 5, Article XI
was violated in that the law created a corporation
for municipal purposes by special law. The Court
said at Page 511 the allegation that that section
of the Constitution was violated had
"no merit - as these Constit11tional inhibitions apply only to cities, towns and villages
and subdiivsions of such cities, towns and villages, and do not apply to water conservancy
districts which are not municipalities in contemplation of that term as used in the Con~
stitution.''
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We submit that an Improvement District is
not a city, town or village or subdivision of the same
and that the law authorizing its creation does not
violate Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution. The
reasoning used by the Court in determining the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District
Act and the Water Conservancy Act is just as properly applied to the Improvement District Act.
PLAINTIFF.'S COMPLAINT 8C.
"That said statute is in violation of Article V of the Constitution of the State of
Utah in that said statute is so vague and indefinite that were the courts to interpret the
same the courts would be required to act in a
legislative rather than a judicial capacity."
This allegation appears to the writer to be specious.
If every statute were to be declared unconstitutional
because some phrases, clauses, sentences or words
in it were subject to interpretation in the light of
varying factual situations, then all the laws of Utah
and every other State should be declared unconstitutional in toto. If all statutes were poured in concrete and subject to no interpretation there would be
no need for courts, little need for attorneys, and the
West Publishing Company would have to close its
doors.
A. Plaintiff claims to be worried about the
phrase "and the boundaries of no district shall overlap the boundaries of any other district." It is ob-
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vious from reading the statute that the words ''any
other district" refer to any other Improvement District. The members of the Legislature presumably
know that every square foot of ground in Utah is
located in some school district so it is specious to
conceive that by using the words "any other district," the Legislature intended to prevent the borders of an Improvement District from overlapping
those of some other type of "district."
B. In paragraph B, Plaintiff contends the
words "where title to any real property in the district is held in the name of more than one person, all
the persons holding title thereto must join in the
signing of the written protest," are ambiguous.
Their meaning seems perfectly clear to the writer.
It appears to the writer that the above language is
clearer and leaves less to interpretation than the
language of the Water Conservancy Act which provides in Section 100-11-7, Utah Code Annotated,
1943:
"A petition may be filed ... signed by
not fewer than twenty-five per cent of the
owners of irrigated land in said proposed district.''
Yet the Courts of Utah have had no trouble with
that particular language in the conservancy district
Act in the nine years the law has been in ,effect.
C. Plaintiff worries about the language_ "the
deed records of the county shall be accepted as final
and conclusive evidence of the ownership of the real
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property of the district." Plaintiff asks about owners whose deeds are not recorded, equity owners,
etc. The requirement in tne statute that proof of
ownrship must be based on deed records, it appears
to the writer, reduces confusion as to "ownership"
to a mi~imum. The Conservancy Act in setting up
the procedure for signing petitions and protests uses
only the word "owner" without providing any further standard for a Court to look to. I think Plaintiff's argument, if lodged against the conservancy
act, would be much more credible than directed
against the improvement district act, for the latter
act is clearer, more explicit, less subject to interpretation than the conservancy district act. Yet the
conservancy act has been in operation nine years
and though it has been tested by the Supreme Court
and amended by the Legislature, no need has been
found to interpret or change the word "owner" as
used in connection with petitions and protests provided for in the act.
The writer thinks it unnecessary to treat subparagraph D, E and F of Plaintiff.'s Brief in detail. It should be sufficient to say there is no evidence
that this act is any more ambiguous, uncertain or
more subject to interpretation than any other act
of the Legislature, and if it does contain some ambiguities, it is the function of the Courts to interpret and clarify.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8D.
"That said statt1te violates the provisions
of Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, in this, that
the statute does not provide for adequate review by the Courts, and in fact prohibits or
limits review."
Article I, Section 7, reads:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
Article I, Section 11, reads :
"All Courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause
to which he is a party."
Great pains were taken by the writers of this
statute to protect the property rights of individuals
within the district and to provide them with ample
opportunity for protests and appeal. The writers of
the statute, it appears, bent over backwards to give
property owners in the district a chance to present
their complaints. Note the procedure required by
the statute to be followed:
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1. HEARING
DISTRICT.

ON

ESTABLISHMENT

OF

"County Commission shall give notice of
its intention to establish such district, which
notice shall define the area to be included
therein and the boundaries thereof, shall generally describe the nature and extent of the
improvements proposed, with estimated cost,
and such notice shall designate one of several different kinds of material or forms of
construction.''
All of which was done in the creation of the Magna
District. Publication of the notice for five weeks is
required of a hearing to be held not less than 45
days after the publication of the first notice
"at which time and place all interested parties
may appear before said board of County Commissioners and be heard either in support of
or in opposition to the creation of said proposed district." (Chapter 24, Section 3.)
2.

WRITTEN PROTEST.

In addition to attending the hearing and
protesting in person, Section 3 provides: "Any
taxpayer within said district may on or before ..
said date so fiixed, protest against the establishment of such district, in writing, signed
by the taxpayer, which protest shall be filed
with the County Clerk ... ''
"If, . . . written protest shall be filed
signed by owners representing more than onehalf of the assessed value of taxable property
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within the said proposed district, the district
shall not be established . . . "
3.

WRIT OF REVIEW.

"Any property owner who shall have filed
a written protest ... and whose property has
been included, notwithstanding such protest,
may within 30 days after the adoption of the
resolution establishing the district, apply to
the District Court . . . for a writ of review
of the actions of the board ... but only upon
the ground that his property will not be benefited by the proposed improvements, or upon
the ground that the proceedings in establishing the district have not been in compliance
with the provisions of the statute." Chapter
24, Section 3, Laws of Utah, 1949.
What more does the property owner want? The
law requires the commission to make a finding that
his land will be benefiited and it requires that the
nature and extent of the Improvements be set forth
in the notice of hearing; the property owner may file
a written protest and he may protest in person before the Board and he has at least 45 days before
the hearing to urge others to protest; then he can
"appeal" to the district court if he believes his property will not be benefiited or if he thinks the procedure required by the law has not been followed.
But that isn't the end of his right to object·and
"protect" his property, as will appear below.
4.

HEARING ON BOND ELECTION.
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Before bonds can be issued (Chapter 24, Section 4) fifty real property owners must petition for
a bond election and the commission must give notice
of a hearing
"Which notice shall inform all persons
concerned of the time and place of the hearing
and of their right to appear ... and contend
for or protest the ordering of such bond election. Such notice shall state the amount of
bonds proposed to be issued ... ~'
The property owner has at least 30 days to think
about that and arouse public opinion before the
hearing.
5.

WRITTEN PROTEST.

The property owner has another chance to file
a \Vritten protest against calling the election and
he may appear in person or by attorney at the hearing. The Commission must again determine
"That the proposed improvements would
be for the benefit of all taxable property situa ted in the district ... " (Chapter 24 Section
5.)

Again if the written protests represent more
than fifty per cent in value of the real property in
the district
"The board shall not have authority to
proceed with the calling of the election."
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6.

BOND ELECTION.

The property owner has another chance to "protect" his property by voting against the issuance of
the bonds and by inducing others to do the same.
The Plaintiff says, ''The burden of beating a
bond election is an excessive burden on the protestant, the statute provides no recourse to the Courts
for review." Plaintiff is saying in effect "After the
property owner has been advised as to the nature
and extent of the improvements, after the commission has determined his property will be benefiitedafter he has had a chance to appeal to a court to
force the Commission to prove that it has advised
him of the nature and extent of the improvements
and to prove that his property will be benefited;
after he has had a chance to protest in writing twice,
in person twice at hearings and vote in an elec;..
tion, then," says the Plaintiff, "if he doesn't like the
way the election turned out-the way the people in
his community voted, he should be able to appeal to
the courts." In other words, Plaintiff believes one
protestant and one judge should be able to out-vote
all the remainder of the people in the community.
Many Republicans have felt that way . after
elections for the last 18 years, but as yet they have
not been given the right to appeal the result of an
election, unless there was something irregular in
the election. The property owner in this case, as the
Republican, may resort to the Cour.ts by extraor-
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dinary writ, to challenge the bond election if he
believes it has been conducted irregularly.
The Utah Court, in the case of Lehi City vs.
Meiling, it seems to the writer, clearly and conclusively answers the argument of the Plaintiff. The
writer has already delineated some of the similarities between the Metropolitan Water District Act
and the Improvement District Act and pointed out
they are analogous from the standpoint of purposes and functions. The Metropolitan Water District Act was upheld in spite of the fact that it provides no means by which landowners assessed could
be heard on the question of benefits. The Improvement District Act does provide a writ of review to
the District Court allowing the property owner to
be heard on the question of benefits. Taxation imposed by the Improvement District is a general ad
valorem tax similar to general taxation and not an
assessment for benefits conferred or to be conferred
on any particular property. It is a tax identical in
nature with the tax which a Metropolitan Water
District is empowered to impose.
The subject of the nature of the tax, its implications as far as appeal and hearing and due process are concerned are treated by the Utah Court
in the Lehi City case at Page 536 of the opinion. The
writer desires to quote at length from that case
because he believes it conclusively answers the contentions of the Plaintiff as to matters of appeal and
due process. Mr. Justice Folland said:
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" ( 5) It is contended the act violates the
due process clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions, in that taxing powers conferred
on the district are in the nature of assessments for benefits and no provision is made
for the landowners assessed to be heard on
the question of benefits. The objection is not
well taken, because the tax provided to be
imposed is a general ad valorem tax similar
to general taxation and not an assessment
for benefits as such is known in connection
with drainage, irrigation, and. other special
assessment districts. The right of the property
owner to be heard before a competent tribunal
on the question of benefits is essential to avoid~
running counter to the constitutional requirements of due process before the imposition of
burdens which might result in depriving a
landowner of his property by means of special
assessments. Argyle v. Johnson, 39 Utah 500,
118 P. 487; State ex rel. Lundberg v. Green
River Irrigation District, 40 Utah 83, 119 P.
1039. The people of the district have opportunity to be heard with respect to the organization of the district, and this carries
with it, if adopted and approved by the voters,
the power of taxation on all property within
the district for the purposes of the district.
Provision is made in the act for the impositionof such taxes on the property as assessed
and valued for purposes of general taxation
so that the property owners have a right to be
heard as to the valuation of their property
the same as when such property is levied upon
for general taxes. This same objection was the
strongest and most important one urged
against validity of the Metropolitan Water
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· District Act before the Supreme Court of
California in City of Pasadena vs. Chamberlain, supra. The Court gave such a satisfactory explanation of the grounds on which it
sustained the validity of the legislation in the
face of such objection that we can do no
better than adopt their reasons and quote fully from that decision:
" 'This contention presents precisely the
same question which was presented to this
court in several recent cases. Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal. 507, 169 P. 82; Miller & Lux v.
Board of Supervisors, 189 Cal. (254), 255,
208 P. 304; In re Orosi Public Utility 'District, 196 Cal. 45, 235 P. 1004. An examination of these cases will serve to show that the
former distinction sought to be drawn between what are governmental and what are
proprietary powers to be exercised by public
corporations, in so far as the maintenance of
these by general taxation is concerned, is fast
fading out of our jurisprudence. The most
recent case, above cited, aptly expresses this
tendency, werein it says:
"'We take it to be now a general accepted proposition that, while a municipality,
which undertakes to supply those of its inhabitants who will pay therefor with utilities
and facilities of urban life, is performing a
function not governmental, but more often
committed to private corporations ... with
whom it may come into competition, it is, in
fact, engaging in business upon municipal
capital, and for municipal purposes ... '
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" 'The supplying of water for domestic
uses within municipalities has grown of recent years to be one of the most common and
well-recognized forms of municipal activities
wherein public property is employed and
wherein public taxation is imposed and collected upon the inhabitants of the municipalities regardless of benefits conferred upon particular property, and by the same method by
which taxes are generally levied and collected
for the carrying on of the governmental functions of incorporated cities and towns. Municipal corporations, whether organized under
special charters or general laws, derive these
particular powers from the same legal sources
as those which provide for the organization
of quasi municipal corporations such as that
provided for in this act, and we can perceive
no real distinction between the organization
of a municipal corporation, strictly so-called,
for the carrying forth of the purposes usually
committed to such governmental agencies and
the organization under legislative sanction of
such other governmental agencies as municipal water districts or public utility districts
or metropolitan water districts, which, 'vhile
these may not exercise all of the functions
committed to municipal corporations, strictly
so-called, are empowered to exercise certain
of these functions which have come to be recognized as at least quasi governmental in
character. Nor can we perceive any substantial reason why such district when so organized may not be invested with the same powers
in the matter of the levying and collection of
taxes for the carrying forth of its limited purposes with which municipal corporations are
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invested for the carrying forth of similar,
though more diversified purposes. Nor can we ·
discover any rational theory upon which in
the levy and collection of such taxes the powers of either should be limited in the formation of that class of public agencies wherein
the assessments imposed upon a particular
property have such direct reference to benefits conferred as to require notice and opportunity for hearing to be given to the owners
of the property to be affected by the assessments thus to be imposed. The decision last
above cited expressly holds that any tax levied
and imposed for the purpose of supplying
capital for the foregoing municipal or quasi
municipal purposes is not to be regarded as
'a tax or assessment on property directly
benefited by the construction of some local improvement, but is a general tax levied just as,
and for the same purpose that, any general
municipal tax is imposed for carrying on the
governmental functions and utilitarian objects of duly incorporated cities or towns.'
We are constrained, therefore, to the conclusion that the Legislature in investing metropolitan water districts to be formed under
the provisions of the act in question with
power, through their properly appointed officials, to collect general taxes within the
municipalities uniting in the formation of
such districts for the common purpose of supplying each with water for domestic uses has
not acted in violation of any provision of the
state Constitution to which our attention has
been directed'.''
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For further authority on the subject of whether or not the taxes which can be imposed by action
of the Improvement District are special improvement taxes or general taxes, the writer wishes to
again refer to the Patterick vs. Carbon County Conservancy District case. The writer has already delineated to some extent the similarities in purpose
and function of the Conservancy District and the
Improvement District. At page 511 of the Patterick
case the court said :
"The public purposes for which a water
conservancy district is organized inures to the
benefit of the public generally and therefore
the public can be charged for such benefits
through general taxation."
The chief benefits to be received by a community from the improvements authorized by the improvement district act are adequate culinary water,
adequate fire protection and adequate sewage treatment and disposal. Those benefits are obviously of
such a nature as to benefit every person in the community. The Plaintiff states he will complain if he
is taxed and doesn't receive better water or better
pressure in his particular home, or better fire protection for his particular house. Plaintiff forgets _
that earlier in his Brief he made reference to the
destruction of the school house in Magna by fire because there was not sufficient wat~r pressure to combat the blaze. Providing facilities which would aid
in preventing a recurrence of a school house destruction would certainly benefit the Plaintiff in one way

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44
or another. Perhaps it would assist his child's education, or save his child's life, or save him from an
increase in taxation required to build a new school
house, etc. The point is, an improved water system
in Magna would be of benefit to the Plaintiff even
if the Plaintiff refused to connect onto the system
and insisted on drilling his own private well.
In the case of Lundberg vs. Green River Irrigation District, 119 Pac. 1039, the constitutionality
of the Utah Irrigation District law was challenged.
Under that law the assessment was based on the
benefits given to particular lands included within
the district and the Court denominated the assessment as a special assessment and not a general tax.
Admittedly where special assessments are involved
the landowner must be given an opportunity to be
heard before a proper tribunal on the question of
benefits to his land - a requirement not imposed
on a law which provides for services which benefit
the public generally as is the case with the Metropolitan Water, Conservancy and Improvement District laws .. Justice Frick wrote the opinion in the
case and on page 1040 he stated:
"The Plaintiff bases his application for a
permanent writ upon the assertion that Chapter 74 (Irrigation District Act) is violative
of certain provisions of our Constitution, and
that said chapter is therefore void, and hence
the organization of the district and the issuance of said bonds are without authority of
law. It is provided in said Chapter 74 that,
whenever a majority of the landowners who
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own the larger portion of the lands within a
proposed irrigation district desire to provide
for irrigation, they may present a petition
to the Board of County Commissioners of the
County in which the larger portion of the
lands sought to be incorporated into an irrigation district are situated, asking that such
a district be organized. The board of commissioners are required to give notice of the
pendency of the petition, and upon a hearing
must determine and fix the boundaries of the
proposed district. The commissioners are also
prohibited from excluding any lands from the
proposed district that are susceptible to irrigation by the same system of water works
applicable to other lands in said proposed district; nor shall any land which will not in the
judgment of the board be benefited by said
proposed system be included in such district
if the owner thereof shall make application
at such hearing to withdraw the same."
After setting forth the provisions of the law
the Justice on page 1041 treats the subject of due
process as follows :
"The first ground of attack, namely that
the Plaintiff is deprived of his property without due process of law by what is contained in
said Chapter 74, is fully answered in the
negative by the Supreme Court of California
in Irrigation District vs. Williams, 18 Pac.
379."
Then the Justice cites another case on which
the Utah Court is relying. Then referring to the
law he states:
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"In said chapter the landowner is given
an opportunity to be heard, and is provided
with a proper tribunal to hear him, as to any
objections he may have to urge against including his lands within the boundaries of the
proposed irrigation district."
Even though the irrigation district law involves
special assessments, demanding the right to be heard
on the question of benefits and the Improvement District law provides for benefits to the public generally and thus requires no hearing as to benefits yet the
hearing provided for in the irrigation district law
is not as extensive as that provded for in the Improvement District law. The Improvement District
law, while not required to go as far as the Irrigation District Act, goes further. It not only provides
for hearings before the County Commission and for
written protests to the commission, but it provides
for a writ of review to the District Court on the
question of benefits.
To summarize- the tax authorized by the Improvement District is a general tax. To satisfy the
demands of the due process clause of the constitution there was no constituional need to provide for
landowners assessed to be heard on the question of
benefits. Yet the writers of the law bent over backwards and provided for the landowner to be heard
first before the County Com~ission. That in itself
was enough to satisfy the constitutional demands
of an Irrigation District law where special assessments were involved. But this improvement dis-
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trict act goes even further in consulting constitutional rights than is required of an irrigation district. It provides for a writ of review of the commission's action by the District Court. There should
be no doubt but that the act is constiutional as. far
as the due process clause is concerned.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8E.
"That said statute violates Article I Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
in that it requires property qualifications to
vote, and further that it violates Article IV
Sections 2 and 7 by requiring more qualifications to vote in an election than are specified
in the Constitution of the State of Utah."
The part of Article I Section 4 to which Plaintiff refers is the last sentence of the section which
reads:
"No property qualifications shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office,
except as provided in this constitution."
Article IV Section 2 reads :
"Every citizen of the United States, of the
age of twenty-one years and upwards, who
shall have been a citizen for ninety days, and
shall have resided in the State or Territory
one year, in the county four months, and in
the precinct sixty days next preceding any
election, shall be entitled to vote at such election, except as herein otherwise provided."
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Article IV Section 7 reads:
"Except in elections levying a special tax
or creating indebtedness, no property qualifications shall be required for any person to
vote or hold office."
The Section of the Constitution last quoted is
the answer to Plaintiff's contention. The Improvement District law provides for property qualifications in connection with the vote of approval of the
bonds. Clearly that is an election "creating indebtedness" and comes under the constitutional exception.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8F.
"That said statute is in violation of Article I Section 7, and Article XIV Section 3 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah in that
it deprives a man of his property without due
process of law."
The writer believes the question of due process
has already been adequately treated and that the
Plaintiff's contentions have been met.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8G.
"That said statute violates Article XIV
Section 4 of the ,Constitution of the State of
Utah in that it enables a city, county, town,
school district or other municipal corporation
to exceed the debt limits imposed by the Constitution."
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The Constitutional provision involved reads as
follows:
"When authorized to create indebtedness
as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no
county shall become indebted to an amount,
including existing indebtedness, exceeding
two per centum. No city, town, school district or other municipal corporation, shall
become indebted to an amount, including
existing indebtedness, exceeding four per
centum of the value of the taxable property
therein, the value to be ascertained by the
last assessment for State and County purposes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness; except that in incorporated cities
the assessment shall be taken from the last
assessment for city purposes; provided, that
no part of the indebtedness allowed in this
section shall be incurred for other than
strictly county, city, town, or school district
purposes; provided further, that any city of
the first and second class when authorized as
provided in Section three of this article, may
be allowed to incur a larger indebtedness, not
to exceed four per centum and any city of the
third class, or town, not to exceed eight per
centum additional, for supplying such city or
town with water, artificial lights or sewers,
when the works for supplying such water,
light and sewers, shall be owned and controlled by the municipality.''
It is of particular importance to the Defendant
that this issue be decided by this Court. Bonding
companies are unwilling to purchase the bonds of
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the district until the court has spoken on this specific issue.
The burden of Plaintiff's argument is that the
improvement district is a sub-division of the County in which it is established. It is the contention of
the Defendant that the improvement district is not
the sub-division of a county. In the Lehi City vs.
M eiling case a question before the court was whether or not a Metropolitan Water District was a subdivision of either a city, town or county. The Court
said:
"We are satisfied the Metropolitan Water District is not a subdivision of either a
city, town or county within the m¢aning of
the word 'subdivision' as used in the Constitution."
The writer contends that the Improvement District, like the Metropolitan Water District, is a public agency of government deriving its powers directly from the State by means of a general law
enacted by the Legislature. There are analogous
features of the two districts that should be noted
here:
1. Both entities are created by a general
law enacted by the State Legislature.
2. The indebtedness of each entity is incurred by action of the governing body
of each District and the taxes imposed
upon the district are levied and collected in both instances by the county
government.
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3. With both districts taxes are levied
based on the value of all the property
within the district, rather than being
levied based on benefits to particular
parcels of property within the district.
This third observation is of significance because of the following language in the Meiling case :
"In this state, Irrigation, Drainage and
Mosquito abatement Districts have heretofore been created by legislative enactment,
and the validity of the Drainage and Irrigation Districts has been sustained by this
Court. There is a marked distinction between
such Districts where assessments may be
levied, based on benefits to the property included, and a Metropolitan Water District
where taxes may be levied on the basis of
value of all of the property within the District."
In other words, both the Improvement District
and the Metropolitan Water District are alike in the
above regard, and the Constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District law was upheld.
The following language of the Court in the
Meiling case sets forth eloquently the attitude of
the Court with regard to the indebtedness question as it impinges upon "districts":
"It is true the framers of the Constitution feared debt and wisely attempted to place
restrictions on the governmental subdivisions
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so that they could not incur indebtedness in
such amount as to lead to insolvency. Therestrictions were not, however, placed on the
people directly, but on the state, counties,
cities, towns and schools districts and other
municipalities in and through which the people were to be governed. There is no prohibition expressly or by implication, restraining
the legislative power from providing other
corporations or organizations for public purpose by which the public welfare could be advanced. If the debt limitations are construed
so strictly as to prevent the creation of any
public corporation with the power to incur
debt payable by taxpayers, except those specifically enumerated and to the extent permitted it would seem to follow that the legislative power would not extend to the creation
of irrigation, drainage and other districts
with limited powers. These have the power to
incur debt and to collect money by assessment on property in payment of such debt
and for the operating expenses of the district.
The creation of such districts has been held
within the lawful exercise of power by the
legislature.''
Later in the opinion the Court points out:
"It is generally recognized that the debts
of special improvement or assessment districts are excluded from constitutional limitation with respect to the cities towns, counties, school districts or the state, notwithstanding, they may operate within the same
terri to rial boundaries."
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Drainage, irrigation, mosquito districts have. not
been held by this Court to be sub-divisions of counties. From the standpoint of the relationship betwen the County and drainage, irrigation and improvement districts there are many features of
those districts that make them analogous:
1. They are all created under general
statutes enacted by the legislature.
2. 'They are all created by petition to and
action of the Board of County Commissioners.
3. The taxes authorized to be imposed
on residents of the districts are levied
and collected by the County government.
The writer contends that irrigation and drainage districts are just as much "creatures of the
County Commission" as the Improvement District,
yet the laws creating them have been upheld as constitutional.
On this subject the action of this Court in the
case of Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy
District should again be consulted. In reference to
this indebtedness question the conservancy district
and the improvement district are analogous:
1. They are created under authority of
general statutes enacted by the legislature.
2. They may each include within their
boundaries parts of a single county.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

54

3. They are empowered through their
governing boards to create indebtedness.
4. The tax levied by both is a general tax
and not a special assessment.
5. Taxes for both are levied and collected
by the County government.
6. Their functions and purposes are similar as has already been pointed out.
In the Patterick case the Court upheld the constitutionality of the water conservancy district act
when the court was faced with the indebtedness
problem. In other words, the Supreme Court made
the same decision in connection with the Conservancy District that it made with regard to the Metropolitan Water District in the Meiling case. The
Court in the Patterick case held that the Conservancy District was not a municipality and it was not
a sub-division of a municipality and that it was
not a sub-division of a county. It is interesting to
note in this connecton that the boundaries of the
Carbon Water Conservancy District were co-terminous with the boundaries of Carbon County. The
Court said:
"A Water Conservancy District is an
arm of the government, separate and distinct
from any municipality, with powers and rules
of its own and the mere fact that its territorial boundaries may encompass the territorial
boundaries of a municipality does not make
it a part of the city. Its powers and objects
are distinct and separate."
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In the case of Wicks vs. Salt Lake City, 208 P.
538, decided in 1922, the Court had this indebtedness problem before it. The Utah Session Laws of
1921 provided for the creation of a special improvement district within a city, and part of that statute
read as follows :
"Section 1. Any city or town which has
issued, or may hereafter issue, any special
improvement bonds or warrants, shall by appropriation from the general fund or by the
levy of a tax of not to exceed one mill in any
one year, or by the issuance of general obligation bonds, or by appropriation from such
other sources as may be determined by the
board of commissioners, or. city council, or
board of town trustees, as the case may be,
create a fund for the purpose of guaranteeing,
to the extent of such fund, the payment of
bonds or warrants and interest thereon, issued against local improvement districts for
the payment of local improvements therein."
The contention was made by the Plaintiff in
the case that the statute was unconstituional due to
the fact that it enabled a city to create a debt in
excess of that allowed by the constitution. With regard to that matter the Court said:
"Section 4 (of the Constitution) limits
the amount of indebtedness that may be created when authorized in the preceding section (by vote of the people, as required in Article 14, Section 3 of the Constitution).
"It must be conceded that these provisions, like every other provision of the ConstiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tution, are the paramount law of the state
concerning the subjects to which they relate.
Any law enacted by the Legislature in conflict therewith is null and void, but the conflict must first be made to appear. If there is
any reasonable doubt about it, the law will
not be declared unconstitutional. This is elementary doctrine. Plaintiff does not contend
that it manifestly appears that the act of 1921
attempts to auhorize the creation of an indebtedness in excess of the limit fixed by the
Constitution, but the contention seems to be
that there is a vague and remote possibility
that a literal compliance with the law may at
some time in the future result in the creation
of an indebtedness in excess of the constitu- ·
tional limit. We seriously doubt if there is a
sufficient showing on the part of Plaintiff concerning this question to justify an extended
discussion. Plaintiff no doubt has presented
every argument that can be presented on that
side of the question, but his argument is by
no means convincing."
Here then the Court allowed the city to provide for the creation of the increased indebtedness
even though there was the possibility of thereby
creating an indebtedness in excess of that permitted by the Constitution. The Court's opinion went off
admittedly chiefly on the argument that due to the
large assessed valuation of the city it would be extremely unlikely that the indebtedness created by
the improvement district would ever cause the city
to create such a large indebtedness as to exceed the
limitations of the constitutional provision. The same
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argument could be advanced for the creation of the
indebtedness by the Magna Improvement District
involved here. The assessed valuation of the area included within the boundaries of the Magna Improvement District is so minute, compared with the assessed valuation of the entire County, that it is inconceivable that an indebtedness amounting to
twelve per cent of the assessed valuation of the
property in that district would ever result in causing the county to exceed its debt limitation.
The editors of A. L. R. in 94 A. L. R. 819 discuss this indebtedness matter and I quote from
their conclusions:
"The general rule is that in applying a
constitutional or statutory debt limit provision to separate and distinct political units
with identical boundaries, exercising different functions, only the indebtedness of the
political unit in question can be considered,
and the debts of the other independent political units should be excluded."
On Page 824 of the ·same volume the editors
: say:
"In most of the cases involving the question the same rule has been applied in the
case of overlapping boundaries as in the case
of identical boundaries so that in determining
the debt limit of a political unit as prescribed
in the constiutional or statutory provisions
applicable thereto, the indebtedness of another
separate and independent political unit which
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embraces part of, or more than the territory
of the former unit is not to be taken into consideration.''
In the light of the authority cited above and the
reasoning set forth in those cases the writer contend~ that the Improvement District is not a municipality or sub-division thereof and is not a subdivision of a county, but is an independent political
unit and its debt should not be included in the debt
of any city or county. Accordingly the law authorizing creation of the district is not in violation of
the indebtedness provision of the Constitution.
PLAINTIF'F'S COMPLAINT 8H.
"That the provisions of Section 8 of said
statute under subheading 'Proceedings on
Bond Issue' relative to advertising bonds for
sale only in Salt Lake City papers, is in violation of Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah."
Article I Section 24 of the Constituion of the
State of Utah reads as folows:

a

"All laws of general nature shall have
uniform operation."
The writers of the act in providing that a notice requesting bids for bonds be published in a newspaper
of general circulation in Salt Lake City had in mind
the fact that all prospective Utah purchasers of such
bonds have their offices in Salt Lake City. The sta-
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tute is designed to provide publication in a newspaper that would be most likely to give notice to the
bond purchasers of the opportunity to bid on the
purchase.
It appears to the writer that in so doing the
legislature did not create any improper classification which would be violative of Section 24, Article
I of the Constitution.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 81.
"That Section 12 of said statute, relative to the sale of water outside the District,
is in violation of the spirit and intent of the
constitutional prohibition set forth in Article
XI, Seeton 6 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah. Said statute also violates Article XI,
Section of the Constitution of the State of
Utah in that Sections 11 and 14 of said statute authorize the Board of Trustees to establish any water rate that it desires, whereas
the Constitution provides that municipalities
must provide water to their inhabitants at
reasonable charges."
Article XI Section 6 reads as follows:
(Municipalities forbidden to sell waterworks or rights.)
"No municipal corporation shall, directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose
of any waterworks, water rights, or sources
of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned
or controlled by it; but all such waterworks,
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water rights and sources of water supply now
owned or hereafter to be acquired by any
municipal corporation shall be preserved,
~ai~taine~ and operated by it for supplying
Its Inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any such
municipal corporation from exchanging water
rights, or sources of water supply for other
water rights or sources of water supply of
equal value, and to be devoted in like manner
to the public supply of its inhabitants."
The answer to the allegation of the Plaintiff is
simply that an improvement district is not a municipality. That issue has been considered earlier in
this Brief. The Supreme Court of Utah has stated
that metropolitan water districts and water conservancy districts are not municipalities. The Utah
Court has not seen fit to declare irrigation districts
or drainage districts municipalities. If those public
agencies are not considered by the Court to be municipalities, then it appears to the writer there is no
basis for adjudicating an· improvement district to
be a municipality.
Plantiff contends that the following provision
of Section 7 of the Improvement District Act is unconsti tu tiona! :
"A trustee may be employed as general
manager of the properties of the district at
such additional compensation as may be fixed
by the other two trustees and when so employed he shall continue to perform the duties
of trustee.''
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Syllogestically speaking, Plaintiff's major premise is that it is a violation of the Utah Constitution for a County official to contract with the Board
of County Commissioners or to receive any compensation from the County other than that which he
is entitled by law to receive as a county official. His
minor premise is that in contemplation of the spirit
of the Constitution an Improvement ·District is the
same as a County and that a Trustee should not be
able to contract with the Board of Trustees or receive any compensation other than that provided
for by the law to be given to a Trustee. His conclusion is that the provision in the law allowing a
Trustee to receive compensation other than that he
is authorized to receive for the performance of his
duties as a Trustee is unconstituional.
The writer contends that according to authority
cited by the Plaintiff himself his major premise is
fallacious, and therefore his conclusion is incorrect.
Plaintiff cites 15 C. J., Paragraph 162 at Pages 497
and 498. That paragraph reads as follows:
''Where the salary or compensation of a
County official is definitely fixed by law, it is
generally held that such sum is intended to
include his entire official remuneration and to
preclude extra charges for any services whatsoever, unless it is clear that the statute contemplated and intended additional compensation for certain extra services . ... Compensation may be recovered by a county official for
the performance of services entirely outside
the scope of the duties of the office where the
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services were performed under a lawful contract with the County Commissioners."
From the language of the statute quoted by the
Plaintiff in his Brief it makes it clear that the statute "contemplated and intended additional compensation for certain extra services." It is also clear
from the statute that the services to be performed
by the "general manager of the properties of the
district" are to be "services entirely outside the
scope of the office" of trustee. Consequently, inasmuch as Plaintiff's major premise is fallacious his
conclusion fails.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8J.
"That Article I, Sections 1, 2 and 27 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah remind
the citizens of Utah that every citizen has certain inherent and inalienable rights; that all
political power is in the people and that frequent recurrence to these fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual
rights and the perpetuity of free government;
that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, is in
violation of these provisions of the Constitution."
It is the contention of the writer that there is
nothing about the Improvement District Act which
is inconsistent with fundamental principles of constitutional government or which would militate
against the security of individual rights and the
perpetuity of free government.
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The writer believes that the contentions of the
Plaintiff have been answered and that this Court
should uphold the constitutionality of the Improve·
ment District Act.
Respectfully submitted,

MARVIN J. BERTOCH
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH
Attorneys for Defendants
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General of
The State of Utah
Attorney for Third
Party Defendant
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